Introduction
Anti-avoidance rules are a tool used to eliminate the abusive behaviour of taxpayers seeking to reduce their tax burden on business and investment transactions. A taxpayer should, can and even must structure a transaction or a business to be associated 2 with as few tax consequences as possible. However, when the only or the primary reason for choosing the structure is tax motivated it should be considered to be abusive behaviour and ought to be countered by the legislator. One way to counter such abusive behaviour is by enacting anti-avoidance rules.
There are several ways to put in place anti-avoidance rules and there are several types of those rules. In general, antiavoidance rules may be divided into two main groups: (1) General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs); and (2) Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules (SAARs). There are also several ways to enact and implement anti-avoidance rules, i.e. by domestic legislation, bilateral and multilateral agreements, court decisions, for example, the European Court of Justice in the European Union, or by the enforcement, interpretation and policy of domestic authorities.
While SAARs are promulgated to counter a specific abusive behaviour, GAARs are used to support SAARs and to cover transactions that are not covered by SAARs. Accordingly, abusive behaviour on the part of a taxpayer that might defeat a SAAR either due to technicalities or sophisticated planning might eventually be targeted and disallowed or recharacterized by a GAAR. However, an essential prerequisite of characterizing 4 In 1997, the US Treasury promulgated regulations under the section 7701 classification rules of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 4 known as the "check-the-box" regulations. Pursuant to the regulations, entities, whether domestic or foreign, can be considered for tax purposes to be partnerships and, therefore, their income is subject to tax at the hands of their members or beneficiaries. However, this rule applies only to entities that are not considered to be "per se corporations".
Per se corporations are considered to be corporations for tax purposes and, therefore, taxed as separate entities, notwithstanding the check-the-box regulations. 5 Consequently, any other entity that is not considered to be per se and wishes to be taxed as corporation should make an election either by the entity or its members to be allowed such a tax treatment. The election is available to any entity, in addition to per se corporations, even if taxed differently in the home country,
i.e. taxed as a partnership in the United States and as a separate entity in the other jurisdiction and vice versa. As a result of the potential of different tax treatment in two jurisdictions, avoiding taxes in multiple tax jurisdictions became easily accessible. The US Congress, therefore, became
2007. It is beyond the scoop of this article to argue whether this estimate was correct and especially, if correct, whether it was justify to introduce section 894 and its regulations. 4. IRC Regs. 301.7701-2 to 301.7701-3. 5.
The list of per se corporations is contained in IRC Regs. 301.7701-2(b). In particular, the Congress understood that the interaction of the tax laws and the applicable tax treaty could provide a business structuring opportunity that would allow
Canadian corporations with U.S. subsidiaries to avoid both U.S. and Canadian income taxes with respect to those U.S.
operations.
Pursuant to these concerns, 7 in 1997, the Congress enacted section 894(c) to deny the limited withholding tax rates, provided by tax treaties with regard to any item of income that is subject to tax in the United States. The denial of the benefits is imposed when the income is derived through an entity that, under US tax law, is treated as a hybrid entity, provided that the income is not considered: (1) to be derived and taxed by the foreign person under the tax laws of the treaty state;
(2) the tax treaty does not contain a provision on its application in respect of an item of income derived through a given by the court, despite the fact that the holding company had minor activities and assets, and received and distributed dividends almost simultaneously. The court had a long debate as to how to define the term "beneficial" owner when the source state was a civil law country and the recipient state was in a common law country.
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For a broader explanation and concern as to multilateral disagreement, see P. Baker, Beneficial Ownership: After Indofood, 6 GITC Rev. 1 (Feb. 2007 
Limitation on Benefits
States regard a tax treaty as a vehicle to provide treaty benefits to residents of the contracting states, the parties to the agreement, as achieved by their treaty delegation. The question that is, therefore, raised in respect of this approach is who is entitled to be treated as a resident of a contracting state and so to enjoy treaty benefits.
Although the text of the OECD Model does not have express antiabuse provisions, the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model (2010) 23 contains an extensive discussion approving the use of such provisions in tax treaties to limit the ability of third country residents to obtain treaty benefits.
The United States' position is that tax treaties should include specific, broad and detailed provisions to prevent misuse of tax treaties by residents of third countries. Consequently, the US It should be noted that not every case of a third country resident establishing legal entity in other state is considered to be treaty shopping. If there are substantial reasons for establishing the structure that were unrelated to obtaining treaty benefits, the structure does not fall within the definition of "treaty shopping".
Article 22 and the anti-abuse provisions of domestic law complement each other, as article 22 effectively determines whether an entity has a sufficient nexus to the contracting state to be treated as a resident for treaty purposes, while the domestic anti-abuse provisions, for example, the business purpose, substance-over-form, step transaction or conduit principles, determine whether a particular transaction should be recast in accordance with its substance. Accordingly, the
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The US tax treaties with Greece, Hungary, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland and Romania do not contain LOB provisions.
internal law principles of the source state may be applied to identify the beneficial owner of an item of income and article 22 is then applied to the beneficial owner to determine if that person is entitled to the benefits of the tax treaty with regard to the income. 26 The LOB article of the US Model (2006) reflects significant changes to the LOB article of the US Model (1996) . These changes are intended to make it more difficult for third country residents to benefit inappropriately from a tax treaty. When a resident of one state derives income from another, the domestic tax laws of the two countries may cause that income to be taxed in both countries, either because of source: resident taxation or because of source:source taxation. Consequently, one purpose of a tax treaty is to prevent the double taxation of residents of the treaty states by allocating taxing rights in respect of cross-border transactions. As noted previously, although a tax treaty is intended to apply only to residents of the two treaty states, residents of a third country may attempt to benefit from a tax treaty by engaging in tax favourable structuring. Bittker & Lokken, supra n. 9. 30. This is intended to grant treaty benefits to a treaty state resident if the resident's owners would have been entitled to the same benefits had the income flowed directly to them. 31.
An arrangement whereby income, such as interest, is lightly taxed because it is derived by a third country PE of a treaty state resident. (27 Nov. 2006 ), Treaties IBFD. 36. This provision is likely to appear on tax treaties with countries that use the exemption method to eliminate double taxation, rather than the credit method. Some countries, for example, Belgium, Denmark and Germany, have moved towards a territorial tax system, which, in general, taxes income generated within the country. In such countries, the income of a resident company derived through a PE located in a treaty state is exempt from tax in the residence state. (6 Aug. 1982) , Treaties IBFD 39. Income and Capital (31 Aug. 1994) , Treaties IBFD. 
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Derivative benefits
Prior to the Netherlands-United States Income Tax Treaty (1992), the Jamaica-United States Income Tax Treaty (1980) 47 was the only occasion on which the United States had agreed to a "derivative contracting state is a person who under the laws of the home country is considered to be a resident.
Although the definition of a resident as provided by article 4(1) refers to the concept of residence as adopted in the domestic laws, the article indicates that the criteria to be considered in defining the term resident are those to the extent to which the term is based on the person's domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature.
The fact that a person is determined to be a resident of a contracting state under the laws of that state does not necessarily entitle that person to the benefits of a tax treaty.
In addition to being a resident under the domestic law, the term resident must also be in line with the criteria contained in article 4 of the tax treaty to be treated as resident for the application of the tax treaty and, therefore, to receive the benefits granted to the residents of a contracting state.
Accordingly, although the definition of a resident to whom a tax treaty might apply is borrowed from and relies on the domestic legislation of each of the contracting states, the various models ensure that the residence of a taxpayer is material and See art. 3(2) of the OECD, UN and US Models, which provides, without exception, that "any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State". not liable to tax in the residence state and the source state does not tax the relevant income due to the application of a tax treaty, for example, article 11, which provides for a sole taxing right in respect of the residence state.
As the "liable to tax" condition has, in recent years, raised many questions regarding entities that are tax exempt in their residence state as to whether or not they are considered to be "liable to tax", countries have expressed their concerns and the OECD has responded. In this respect, the OECD has stated in paragraphs 8.6 to the Commentary on Article 4 (2010), that tax exempted entities, for example, pension funds:
[PCD single spaced] may be exempted from tax, but they are exempt only if they meet all of the requirements for exemption specified in the tax laws. They are, thus, subject to the tax laws of a Contracting State. 55 Furthermore, if they do not meet the standards specified, they are also required to pay tax. The advantage of a GAAR is that is it by definition much broader and less subject to avoidance. The disadvantage is that a GAAR may deter legitimate transactions. However, the evidence from other countries that have GAARs suggests that with appropriate safeguards a GAAR is not a significant disincentive in respect of legitimate transactions, but, rather, that it restricts abusive tax planning. India and the United Kingdom are two countries that are currently contemplating adopting a GAAR for this reason.
The United States is unlikely to enact a GAAR any time soon. The enactment of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 may have an important effect on tax treaties. Before then, it was unclear as 30 to whether or not the IRS had the authority to promulgate SAARs in a treaty context, such as conduit regulations, that could override tax treaties. Now, however, the IRS can argue that the conduit regulations are an application of economic substance, as conduits are likely to lack a bone fide business purpose. It may, therefore, be that, in the treaty context, the conduit regulations will now act essentially as a GAAR and apply to situations that are not caught by the SAARs described previously in this article.
